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Balancing Cost and Emissions Certainty:  
An Allowance Reserve for Cap-and-Trade 
Brian C. Murray, Richard G. Newell, and William A. Pizer 
Abstract 
On efficiency grounds, the economics community has to date tended to emphasize price-based 
policies to address climate change—such as taxes or a “safety-valve” price ceiling for cap-and-trade—
while environmental advocates have sought a more clear quantitative limit on emissions. This paper 
presents a simple modification to the idea of a safety valve: a quantitative limit that we call the allowance 
reserve. Importantly, this idea may bridge the gap between competing interests and potentially improve 
efficiency relative to  tax or other price-based policies. The last point highlights the deficiencies in several 
previous studies of price and quantity controls for climate change that do not adequately capture the 
dynamic opportunities within a cap-and-trade system for allowance banking, borrowing, and 
intertemporal arbitrage in response to unfolding information. 
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Balancing Cost and Emissions Certainty:  
An Allowance Reserve for Cap-and-Trade 
Brian C. Murray, Richard G. Newell, and William A. Pizer∗ 
Introduction 
The economic debate over using taxes versus cap-and-trade to control pollution 
emissions revolves around the relative merits of using prices versus quantities as the policy 
instrument. A cap-and-trade system fixes the quantity of emissions allowed but leaves the market 
price of emissions rights uncertain. In contrast, a tax fixes the price of emissions at the tax rate 
but leaves the quantity of emissions uncertain. This trade-off raises essential questions for policy 
design: which form of uncertainty is a greater burden to society? What can be done to minimize 
that burden or maximize net benefits? A sizable economics literature has addressed these 
questions, dating back to Weitzman (1974) and others.  
Taxes and cap-and-trade are, in some sense, extreme examples of the alternative market-
based approaches that are available to correct an emissions externality. The government 
stipulates that emitters must obtain the “right to emit.” These rights (typically called allowances 
or permits) are either supplied with infinite elasticity at a fixed price (the tax) or with zero 
elasticity at a fixed supply (the cap). A key alternative—initially suggested by Roberts and 
Spence (1976) and later developed in the context of climate policy by Pizer (2002)—is the idea 
of a “safety valve,” in which  a cap-and-trade system is coupled with a price ceiling at which 
additional allowances can be purchased (in excess of the cap). So long as the allowance price is 
below the safety-valve price, this hybrid system acts like cap-and-trade, with emissions fixed but 
the price left to adjust. When the safety-valve price is reached, however, this system behaves like 
a tax, fixing the price but leaving emissions to adjust.  Given the importance attached by many 
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stakeholders and policymakers to containing the costs of any U.S. climate policy, this approach 
has received considerable attention in the U.S. debate over climate change regulation (e.g., 
Samuelsohn 2008), and  has come to be known as the “cost-containment” issue (Pizer and 
Tatsutani 2008). 
Cap-and-trade with a safety valve represents one of many possible mechanisms that lie 
between the two extremes of a pure price or a pure quantity instrument. It offers a more 
malleable supply curve for emissions allowances, containing both vertical and flat segments. 
This paper discusses a second mechanism that includes features of both price and quantity 
instruments. We believe this approach, which we call an allowance reserve, is particularly 
promising. The basic idea goes one step beyond the safety valve: while the safety valve stipulates 
that an unlimited number of allowances be made available at the specified safety-valve price, the 
allowance reserve stipulates both a ceiling price at which cost relief is provided and a maximum 
number of allowances to be issued in exercising that relief. Much like a safety-valve mechanism 
can mimic either a pure price or pure quantity control, depending on how the cap and safety-
valve price are set, an allowance reserve can mimic a pure price, pure quantity, or safety-valve 
approach, depending on how the ceiling price and volume are set. 
Three motivations underlie our interest in this mechanism.  The first two are largely 
practical in nature, while the third hints at a new twist on the conditions underlying optimality, in 
contrast to the traditional “prices versus quantities” perspective. The first motivation is simple: as 
we describe below, the safety valve represents a special case of the allowance reserve where the 
volume of available allowances is very large or unlimited. Thus, an allowance reserve has the 
capacity to do as well if not better than the safety valve in terms of matching public interest 
described below as a blend of economic efficiency and political feasibility.  That is, political 
economy conditions suggest that public interest may be better served with an allowance reserve 
because it is more likely to sustain a coalition that will enable welfare-enhancing policy to be 
enacted.  
Second, the reserve mechanism addresses one problem with a safety valve. Although 
most cap-and-trade programs permit allowance banking, which can help equilibrate present value 
prices across different time periods and increase dynamic efficiency, allowance banking coupled 
with a safety valve creates a dynamic problem. Suppose the cap needs to be tightened and as a 
result the safety-valve price is expected to increase dramatically at some point in the future. With 
an ordinary safety valve, an expectation of much higher prices in the future would lead rational 
firms to buy as many allowances as possible at the current, low safety-valve price in order to 
save them for use later when prices are high. Absent a mechanism to limit such purchases, they Resources for the Future  Murray, Newell, and Pizer 
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could effectively overwhelm efforts to tighten the future cap, thereby undermining long-term 
environmental policy goals. An allowance reserve would address this potential problem by 
placing an upper limit on the available number of extra allowances. 
Finally, and most importantly at a fundamental level, most economic analysis of price 
and quantity controls under uncertainty does not adequately capture the dynamic nature of the 
regulatory process suggested by the preceding paragraph. In particular, as new information 
arises—about the benefits, costs, or global commitment to solving the problem of climate 
change—expectations about the likely long-term emissions level and emissions price will evolve. 
Therefore, in order to achieve dynamic efficiency, prices need to adjust regularly so that current 
prices continue to reflect discounted expected future prices. A cap-and-trade program with 
banking, borrowing, and eventual adjustment of the cap can achieve that result if economic 
agents have sufficient foresight and capacity to form rational expectations about the longer term 
(Newell et al. 2005). This factor alone identifies an important advantage of dynamic cap-and-
trade with banking and borrowing over other approaches. Nonetheless, these conditions may not 
hold—or at least are not assured—particularly in the early years of a program when cost 
uncertainty would be high, a significant bank would not yet have developed, and market actors 
would still be struggling to understand the new market. An allowance reserve could be used to 
help the market toward such an equilibrium by anchoring initial prices near or below the ceiling 
price.  
We focus here on the importance for climate policy design of uncertainty in the costs and 
benefits of greenhouse gas mitigation. There are of course other important design factors to 
consider, including the degree to which the policy raises revenue (e.g., through taxes or 
allowance auctions), how those revenues are used (e.g., reducing other taxes, additional 
spending), and the stringency of the policy (i.e., the cap or tax level).  Nonetheless, most of these 
other elements can be designed largely independently of the instrument choice of cap-and-trade 
versus a tax.  
The remainder of this paper is organized into several sections. The next section provides 
background on market-based emissions regulation, including the current policy debate about 
price versus quantity instruments, and discusses the allowance reserve idea in more detail. This is 
followed by a discussion of the advantages of a reserve-based approach and how it addresses 
some key practical problems with the current suite of alternatives. We then discuss the issue of 
optimality in a dynamic context where policies evolve over time, making the case that (1) cap-
and-trade with banking and borrowing could approach optimality with sufficient intertemporal 
flexibility, and (2) absent the institutions or foresight necessary for such optimality, the Resources for the Future  Murray, Newell, and Pizer 
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allowance reserve may be a useful way to help move market outcomes in the correct direction. 
We end with a discussion of the remaining issues that surround practical implementation of the 
allowance reserve, including establishing the ceiling price, reserve size, and release mechanisms. 
We present conclusions in the final section.  
Market-Based Emissions Regulation and the Reserve-based Approach  
Market-based emissions regulation works by requiring emitters to hold emissions 
allowances and then establishing a mechanism for supplying those allowances. The two simplest 
supply mechanisms are (1) a tax that fixes the price associated with purchasing allowances and 
(2) cap-and-trade, which establishes a fixed supply of allowances, either auctions or gives them 
away for free, and then allows trading until the allowances are used to cover emissions. The tax 
is typically referred to as a price-based approach and cap-and-trade as a quantity-based approach 
to emissions control.1  
A key point, highlighted by Weitzman (1974), is that price and quantity controls lead to 
distinctly different outcomes when there is uncertainty about costs. While emissions are constant 
under cap-and-trade, price varies; in contrast, under a tax, price is constant but emissions vary. 
Weitzman (1974) derived conditions under which one or the other policy is preferred in expected 
efficiency terms based on the relative slopes of the curves for the marginal cost and marginal 
benefits of emissions control. Since then, many papers have found that for climate change 
policies, the marginal benefits of mitigation (or marginal damages from emissions) are relatively 
flat over the relevant range of annual emissions, and, using a somewhat modified Weitzman 
argument, that price-based policies are therefore preferred in terms of economic efficiency 
(Kolstad 1996; Pizer 2002; Hoel and Karp 2002; Newell and Pizer 2003). Note that the quantity 
policy (i.e., cap-and-trade) modeled in these papers corresponds to annual emissions targets 
without banking or borrowing, a matter we return to below. 
Of course, the perfectly inelastic (cap-and-trade) and perfectly elastic (tax) emissions 
allowance supply curves are the two simplest extremes of a wide range of policies the 
government could use to provide emissions allowances to the market. Roberts and Spence (1976) 
examined one alternative: coupling cap-and-trade with a price floor and ceiling. This approach 
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generates three types of outcomes depending on the realized demand: (1) when demand is low, 
the price is set by the floor, and the quantity of allowances is below the cap; (2) when demand is 
moderate, the quantity of allowances is determined by the cap, and the price is somewhere 
between the floor and ceiling; and (3) when demand is high, the price is set by the ceiling, and 
emissions are above the cap.2  Depending on the choice of design parameters (i.e., cap, floor, 
ceiling), the policy also has the ability to mimic either a tax (if the price ceiling or cap level is 
sufficiently low) or pure cap-and-trade (if the floor is low and the ceiling high). Owing partly to 
the previously mentioned authors’ emphasis on price-based policies and partly to the politics of 
wanting to have both certainty about prices and stringent emissions limits, there has been a 
significant emphasis on policy with a relatively low, stringent cap level and low price ceiling. 
This approach, where the price ceiling is referred to as a “safety valve,” has garnered 
considerable attention and political support over the past five years as climate policy proposals 
have made their way to Congress (Samuelsohn 2008). The price floor, though it has received less 
attention in the federal policy debate, is being implemented in the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative cap-and-trade program in the Northeastern U.S. states.   
Representing the allowance reserve idea requires only a slight adjustment to the Roberts 
and Spence (1976) supply schedule (see the right panel of Appendix Figure 2). The price ceiling 
that previously allowed an unlimited volume of allowances to be purchased now also has a 
quantitative limit, which is the “allowance reserve.” Basically, we have simply added another 
kink in the allowance supply schedule and made it more flexible in its ability to balance price 
and quantity goals. Indeed, the first-best policy would be to specify an allowance supply 
schedule that mimicked the marginal damages from higher emissions. In this sense, the 
allowance reserve offers a well-defined improvement over the alternative policies developed so 
far, each of which remains a special case. In essence, the reserve can be deployed in a way that 
reflects something closer to the increasing marginal social cost of emissions.  
When implemented, all market-based policies require us to identify a group of regulated 
entities whose direct emissions or embodied emissions (for upstream regulation of fuels) are 
measured and reported on a regular basis, typically annually. Under a tax policy, those entities 
are then required to pay a specified tax ($/ton) applied to the measured amount of emissions. 
Under cap-and-trade, they are required to acquire and surrender allowances.  
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A key feature in virtually all proposed greenhouse gas cap-and-trade programs is 
banking, under which unused allowances in one year can be used in subsequent years. With 
banking, there can be an incentive to reduce emissions early—particularly during a gradual 
phasedown of emissions targets—and it is not necessary for the market to meet the target exactly 
each year. If that were the case, there would be a danger that requiring emissions to match the 
number of allowances exactly would result in either too few allowances—causing the price to 
skyrocket— or too many allowances—causing the price to plummet. The former occurred in the 
California NOx RECLAIM market; the latter occurred in Phase I of the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme (ETS) for greenhouse gases. Both systems significantly restricted banking and 
borrowing across compliance periods. In the EU ETS, the main culprit was that banking was not 
allowed between Phase I (pre-Kyoto) and Phase II (Kyoto). That, combined with a generous 
allocation, eventually led to an excess supply of allowances and drove the price to zero at the end 
of Phase I. In contrast, systems that have allowed banking (and possibly borrowing) have tended 
to have much smoother price behavior as the price at the end of one period tends to match the 
price at the beginning of the next due to allowance fungibility across periods and market 
arbitrage. 
What about more complex policies?  The price floor in the Roberts and Spence (1976) 
hybrid policy could be implemented in two ways. If the allowances associated with the cap are 
all distributed for free, the only alternative is for the government to agree to buy any allowances 
that regulated entities are willing to sell at the specified floor price. If, however, some of the 
allowances are auctioned, the price floor could be implemented by specifying a minimum price 
in the auction. In this way, allowances only enter the market if the price meets or exceeds the 
floor; otherwise, less than the full volume of allowances are sold. 
The price ceiling, or safety valve, could be implemented by having the government agree 
to sell additional allowances at the specified ceiling price.  However, there has been a wrinkle in 
such legislative proposals (e.g., S. 1766 in the 110th Congress, the “Bingaman–Specter” bill); 
that is, unlike ordinary allowances, these additional allowances are not bankable and must be 
used in the year they are released. This places an implicit limit on the volume of safety-valve 
allowances that might be sold in any year, namely the total volume of emissions for that year. 
Thus, under such proposals, one could in principle use safety-valve allowances to meet all of 
one’s current-year emissions obligations and bank ordinary allowances for the future. Another 
wrinkle in the safety-valve provision of S. 1766 is that the safety valve is only available during 
one month each year, while firms are doing final balancing of their emissions and allowance 
holdings. This avoids a potential run on the safety valve while Congress might be debating Resources for the Future  Murray, Newell, and Pizer 
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whether to raise the level or remove the safety valve altogether in the future—a debate that 
would hopefully be completed during the eleven-month period when the safety valve is 
unavailable. We return to this issue below, as it is not obvious that such a sequence of events is 
likely. 
The allowance reserve takes the price ceiling idea a step further. As just described, an 
unlimited nonbankable safety-valve could allow the release of up to one year’s worth of 
emissions at any one time. The allowance reserve, however, could limit the use of this safety 
valve to a significantly smaller amount. The appropriate size of the reserve will ultimately 
depend on the stringency of the cap, the ceiling price, and the degree of remaining price volatility 
that is acceptable. A reserve of perhaps ten to twenty percent of the annual cap would reflect the 
range of emissions reductions sought by many current proposals over the first decade, coupled 
with varying assumptions about the price ceiling.  The issue of how to choose the reserve size is 
further addressed later in this paper. 
This raises an important question: how does the government allocate the extra allowances 
from a reserve if demand exceeds reserve supply at the ceiling price? There are several ways to 
do this. These are outlined in detail below, but perhaps the most compelling is analogous to the 
price-floor approach, but instead auctions the reserve allowances with a minimum price that is 
equal to the ceiling price (versus the floor price). The result would be: (1) no sales, (2) sales less 
than the limit, at the ceiling price, or (3) sales equal to the limit, at or above the ceiling price. 
Thus, the allowance reserve does not guarantee the ceiling price in the same way as an explicit 
price ceiling or safety valve. On the other hand, as discussed in the next section, it has several 
practical and theoretical advantages. 
Advantages of an Allowance Reserve 
Representing Marginal Damages Across Cumulative Emissions 
Based on analyses of marginal damages from emissions, the research cited above finds 
that the allowance supply schedule for emissions should be roughly flat over the relevant range 
of annual greenhouse gas emissions. This would seem to suggest that the allowance reserve idea 
offers no efficiency improvement over either a tax-based or safety-valve approach. Yet that 
research does not consider the marginal benefit function over cumulative greenhouse gas limits 
(or in turn the shape of the associated allowance supply schedule) over longer time horizons. 
Indeed, it seems almost certain that when viewed over many decades of cumulative emissions, 
the marginal damage of the first ton abated would be higher than the marginal damage of the last. Resources for the Future  Murray, Newell, and Pizer 
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In this case, the additional kink in allowance supply represented by the reserve approach, 
cumulated over many years, should be able to better represent an upward sloping marginal 
damage function and deliver an outcome that is more efficient than the tax-based and safety-
valve approaches.  
Of course, given the tremendous uncertainty and time scale concerning climate change 
(Weitzman 2008), we must be cautious about economic analyses of the level and shape of the 
climate mitigation benefit function. Moreover, we believe there are yet other reasons to expect 
that traditional price and quantity comparisons are problematic in a dynamic setting—an issue 
we return to in the next section.  
Expanding Political-Economic Flexibility 
Another important concern is that most environmental advocates have opposed any price-
based approach, including the safety-valve variant. In an October 8, 1997, letter to the President 
in advance of negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol, seventeen environmental advocacy groups 
indicated their opposition to a safety valve mechanism.3 More recently, however, these groups 
have expressed openness to the idea of a quantity-limited safety valve captured in the allowance 
reserve approach. Leading environmental advocacy groups, including some of those who signed 
the 1997 letter opposing a safety valve, supported an amended version of the America’s Climate 
Security Act (S. 3036) in 2008, which included the allowance reserve idea (Eilperin and Mufson 
2008). In this way, a simple interpretation of the allowance reserve—that its additional flexibility 
can better represent public interest—may be the most relevant argument when “public interest” 
includes not just economic views of optimality but also the perspective of key stakeholders. In 
other words, one very practical advantage of the allowance reserve idea is that it may be able to 
bridge differences between environmental advocates seeking a cap on emissions and industrial 
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interests concerned about costs, in much the same way that some viewed the safety valve more 
than a decade ago (Kopp et al. 1997).  Operating under the presumption that failure to enact a 
climate policy at all would lower social welfare, all else equal, a design element such as an 
allowance reserve that can break an impasse,can enhance overall efficiency relative to the status 
quo.   
Addressing Concerns over Ability to Achieve Long-term Targets   
There is a second practical reason for considering the allowance reserve over the pure 
safety-valve idea:  How would one otherwise deal with evolving expectations of stricter targets 
and higher prices?  That is, despite the attempt to structure current proposals with targets through 
2050, it seems almost inevitable that revisions will occur after a decade or so. In anticipation of 
tightening future caps, current prices would rise assuming that current allowances could be 
banked for future compliance obligations, which are now anticipated to be more expensive. For 
example, the U.S. sulfur dioxide trading program was revised in 2005—fifteen years after 
passage of the 1990 amendments establishing the program—in a way that lowered allowed 
emissions by fifty percent in 2010 and seventy percent in 2015 (U.S. EPA 2005).  In response, as 
shown in Figure 1, the price of allowances began a significant run-up in 2004 as debate began in 
earnest over tightening the emissions cap under the program through the Clean Air Interstate 
Rule. By 2005, the rules were finalized, with a halving of the emissions limit set to begin in 
2010. Allowance prices peaked soon after. By 2008, the prices had settled down to roughly 
double their predebate level, with a May decline in part reflecting legal challenges to the 
rulemaking (Argus Media 2008) or possibly expectations that climate change regulation will 
depress future SO2 allowance prices. All of this has happened years in advance of the actual 
change in emissions limits. So clearly market participants do act in anticipation of future target 
stringency. 
All of this points to a potential problem with the ordinary safety valve when it is coupled 
with banking and evolving expectations of stricter targets. Under these circumstances, as firms 
and individuals become convinced that future prices will be well above the current safety valve, 
they will want to make use of the safety valve as much as possible, acquiring emissions 
allowances cheaply now that will quickly become more valuable in the future.  Or, if safety-
valve allowances cannot be banked, will allow regulated entities to preserve more valuable 
ordinary allowances for the future.  That is, even without the ability to bank safety-valve 
allowances, there is a real possibility of accumulating multiple years’ worth of allowances if 
people become convinced of the impending change many years in advance. The SO2 trading Resources for the Future  Murray, Newell, and Pizer 
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program, for example, saw more than a year’s worth of allowances accumulated early in the 
program without a safety valve, owing to the relatively easy targets from 1995 through 1999 and 
anticipation of stricter targets legislated for 2000. 
The accumulation of a large bank of allowances—perhaps more than an entire year’s 
worth of allowances—poses two related problems. The first is superficial: from an appearance 
standpoint, people may see a run on the safety valve, and a large accumulation of allowances 
from it, as a systemic failure. The second is related, but more substantive: a particularly large 
bank could begin to thwart efforts to cut emissions in the future. This is not an issue in the SO2 
program because emissions reductions are relatively large compared with historic emissions—
fifty percent in the 1990 amendments, starting in 2000, and fifty percent again in 2010 under the 
Clean Air Interstate Rule. One year’s worth of banked allowances would be used up in two years 
following a fifty percent cut (were facilities to try avoiding their fifty percent cut in emissions).  
In contrast, CO2 emissions reductions are anticipated to occur more slowly as entirely new 
technologies cutting across many sectors must be brought into use. A relatively tough target 
might mean a ten to twenty percent reduction from baseline within the first decade, in which case 
a bank on the order of one year of allowances could delay such a change for five to ten years 
without reducing emissions. We emphasize only that this could (but not necessarily would) be a 
problem because, even in the worst case, the tougher target could be designed with the bank in 
mind, in much the same way that programs with offset credits from uncapped sources often seek 
a tougher target than would be practical if those offset opportunities did not exist.  Further, there 
is little evidence concerning how large of an allowance bank firms might accumulate (it could, in 
fact, be much larger than one year’s worth of allowances), how fast they might spend it down, 
and in turn how much this might affect any future tightening of the cap. 
The allowance reserve tackles both potential problems head on by simply limiting the 
volume of extra allowances entering the market and therefore limiting the potential for these 
extra allowances to contribute to an excessively large bank. As noted above, existing legislative 
proposals for a safety valve limit the released volume to the annual emissions level. With 
emissions reductions of perhaps ten to twenty percent per decade, this seems far more than is 
necessary to deal with anything except the desire to bank. In this case, an annual allowance 
reserve limit of about ten to twenty percent of the cap should be sufficient to address short-term 
uncertainty while leaving longer-term expectations free to drive near-term prices. Resources for the Future  Murray, Newell, and Pizer 
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Optimal Policy in a Dynamic Setting 
Most of the literature comparing price and quantity policies has ignored the 
aforementioned dynamic feature:  that policies will inevitably be revised as new information 
arises and policymakers revisit the issue—what we might call dynamic price and quantity 
policies (i.e., policies that are updated over time).  Newell et al (2005) emphasize that such 
revisions can be used to make a dynamic quantity policy mimic an unadjusted price policy.  Here 
we suggest that a dynamic quantity policy might do better, even when the price policy is 
dynamic as well, particularly in a world where future damages depend only on cumulative 
emissions and not on their time path, as is roughly true for greenhouse gases.  The key is 
intertemporal flexibility coupled with foresight about these revisions.  As we elaborate below, 
the allowance reserve may in turn help foresight to drive near-term prices—in this case a 
desirable, even optimal, feature.  
To illustrate this point that dynamic quantity policies may do better than dynamic prices, 
let’s imagine a simple world with three time periods: when current policy is set (period 0), when 
that policy takes effect and firms respond (period 1), and some period in the future when policy 
can be revised (period 2). Importantly, improved information on costs, benefits, and participation 
is arriving each period, so that there is a better notion of the optimal policy in period 1 (when no 
policy adjustment is possible) and an even better notion in period 2. For simplicity, we could 
assume that period 2 involves complete knowledge of costs and benefits and is also the last 
period of relevant activities.  In any case, with better information in period 2, one can revise 
either a price or quantity policy to deliver improved outcomes in period 2 because there will be a 
better sense of how to balance costs and benefits compared to period 0.   
Assuming revised price and quantity controls are equally efficient in period 2, the 
question of comparing various policies hinges on what happens in period 1 when firms respond 
to policies set in period 0, but with improved knowledge about costs and benefits as well as 
foresight about period 2.  Consider the first-best outcome.  Based on the working assumption that 
damages depend only on cumulative emissions, efficiency would lead us to minimize the 
expected present value of the total emissions abatement costs associated with achieving the 
cumulative emissions limit decided in period 2. This leads to a simple efficiency condition that 
the marginal cost (i.e., emissions price) each period should equal the present value of expected 
long-run marginal costs (see the Technical Appendix for a mathematical formulation of this first-
order condition and the arguments that follow.)   That is, it would be optimal to choose period 1 
emissions such that marginal costs in period 1 are equal to the (discounted) expected marginal 
costs of meeting the cumulative target through the revised period 2 cap.  Given the limited Resources for the Future  Murray, Newell, and Pizer 
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information available when period 1 emissions must be chosen, the cumulative cap will not be 
known exactly, but with additional information relative to period 0, expectations of the period 2 
cap should be revised from the expectations in period 0 when the policy is set.  Now that we 
understand the first-best outcome conditional on available information, we can examine how 
dynamic price and quantity policies compare in period 1.   
Specifically, consider two policies set in period 0 and revised in period 2: a tax and a cap-
and-trade program, where the cap-and-trade program allows banking (and borrowing, if 
necessary).   
Performance of a Tax Program 
An optimizing government that is setting the period 1 tax in period 0 would choose a tax 
level that equates the present value of expected marginal costs across the periods given the 
information it has at the time, thereby minimizing expected total costs as seen in period 0. The 
important point is that in period 1, firms would then choose to emit an amount such that their 
marginal costs—given the resolution of cost uncertainty in period 1—are equal to the tax which 
was set in period 0. Firms will not match their marginal costs to the expected period 2 marginal 
costs (updated with new information on both costs and mitigation benefits in period 1) because 
there is no incentive to do so. Specifically, there is no ability to shift compliance obligations 
from the period with high (expected, discounted) costs to the one with low (expected, 
discounted) costs in a tax-based system. The emissions outcome in the first period would 
therefore not generally satisfy the previously mentioned efficiency condition because 
expectations about period 2 marginal costs will have changed between periods 0 and 1, but no 
responsive action will be taken by the affected parties.  
This type of result is inherent in the classic Weitzman framework where policies are fixed 
prior to uncertainty being revealed.  Neither a price nor (a nonbankable) quantity policy is 
optimal ex post because neither exactly matches realized (or updated expectations about) 
marginal costs and marginal benefits. Both instruments are generally inefficient in such a setting, 
so the issue becomes one of choosing the instrument with the lowest deadweight loss. Even when 
period 1 brings about expected changes in period 2 tax rates, there is virtually no incentive to 
deviate from the otherwise standard behavior setting period 1 marginal costs equal to the fixed-
in-period-0 tax. The only possible incentive to deviate arises if changed expectations about future 
tax rates affects investment in long-lived emissions abatement capital that would be subject to 
the future tax. Resources for the Future  Murray, Newell, and Pizer 
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Performance of a Cap-and-Trade System  
The question is can cap-and-trade in a dynamic setting with banking and borrowing do 
any better? To find out, let’s imagine that instead of a tax the government sets a period 1 cap in 
period 0, firms decide how much to emit during period 1 and bank or borrow until period 2, and 
everyone expects that in period 2 the government will set a period 2 cap to deliver the ultimate, 
optimized-with-complete-information-in-period-2, cumulative emissions target (or, more 
generally, a cap based on better information in period 2). Note that in period 2 the government 
can enforce any emissions level by accommodating or absorbing the bank or allowance debt 
acquired by firms in period 1.  With this information in period 1, a cost-minimizing firm would 
form its best expectation of period 2 marginal costs and choose period 1 emissions such that 
marginal costs in period 1 would equal the discounted value of the expected period 2 marginal 
cost, regardless of the first period cap.  
Thus, a cap-and-trade system with banking, borrowing, and an expectation of eventual 
adjustment of the emissions target can achieve the best possible outcome given the information 
that is known in period 1 even though policy is set in period 0. What drives this result? 
Why Dynamic Cap-and-Trade Can Deliver a Better Outcome 
 The key is intertemporal flexibility and foresight. Through dynamic market arbitrage, 
whereby firms equate (present value) prices in periods 1 and 2 for the perfectly fungible 
allowances, the cap-and-trade system allows the information revealed about benefits, costs, and 
future expected targets to be transmitted to markets today. That is, knowing that new information 
on costs and benefits gained during the first period of the policy will lead to adjustment of future 
caps, firms have an incentive to adjust emissions during period 1 so that they can bank (or 
borrow) more (or less) now in order to equate marginal costs over the two periods. The existence 
of an intertemporal market for emissions allowances—something that is absent with a tax—
provides the vehicle for doing this. Note that in terms of the efficiency condition, benefit 
information is transmitted through expectations about the cumulative target, while cost 
information is transmitted through both the cost function itself and expectations about the 
cumulative target. 
The tax instrument, in contrast, only provides market incentives for adjusting emissions 
in response to information revealed about period 1 costs in a simple way that keeps marginal 
costs equal to the fixed-in-period-0 tax (and does not respond at all to changes in expectations 
about benefits or future targets). With a tax instrument, even if firms correctly anticipate a higher 
marginal cost or tax in the future, they cannot arbitrage against this outcome by overcomplying Resources for the Future  Murray, Newell, and Pizer 
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now and banking residual allowances for use in the future. This undermines their ability to 
efficiently manage costs. Taxes (like the cap) can of course be adjusted over time, but during the 
period between adjustments there will be inefficiently high or low levels of abatement and costs.  
Interestingly, this incentive structure differs in a fundamental way from the classic 
Weitzman setting. In that static setting, only the tax (or price) policy provides incentives for 
firms to change behavior, only in response to new cost information, and only in a simple way 
that keeps marginal costs constant. The quantity policy in that case does not transmit any new 
information—firms must simply meet the target and have no flexibility to adjust by banking or 
borrowing. Neither policy transmits any new information about benefits or future targets. In 
contrast, in the dynamic cap-and-trade setting that is relevant here, firms do have an incentive to 
adjust under the quantity policy in response to both new cost and new benefit information 
because of adjusted expectations about future targets and marginal costs. While both policies can 
eventually be adjusted to achieve the desired target, the dynamic cap-and-trade policy provides a 
mechanism for firms to respond during the first period, when policy is fixed, while the tax does 
not. 
All of this suggests that for a cumulative emissions problem like greenhouse gases, a cap-
and-trade program with sufficient banking and borrowing can in principle deliver a better 
outcome than taxing emissions. This conclusion has been recognized to some degree for some 
time (Jacoby and Ellerman 2003). Extending prior research on optimal banking and borrowing 
(Rubin 1996, Kling and Rubin 1997) to a stochastic instrument choice context, Newell et al. 
(2005) rigorously showed how intertemporal banking and borrowing would allow firms to 
smooth abatement costs across time, thereby offsetting the traditional disadvantage of cap-and-
trade relative to taxes. They also suggested several practical mechanisms for implementing such 
an approach, including an allowance reserve. What is new here, we believe, is that this is the first 
time conventional economics has suggested cap-and-trade can be better than tax-based 
approaches based on Weitzman-like efficiency grounds, with appropriate dynamic modifications. 
The key, as discussed above, is that most previous analyses have either ignored or 
underappreciated both the evolution of information and the dynamic nature of policymaking that 
are core features of a long-term problem like climate change—as well as the common feature of 
banking in most trading programs. 
How Can an Allowance Reserve Enhance Efficiency? 
The discussion and results above raise the question: why do we need an allowance 
reserve at all if cap-and-trade with sufficient banking and borrowing can be optimal (given Resources for the Future  Murray, Newell, and Pizer 
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available information)?  There are at least three reasons. First, the allowance reserve does 
nothing to upset this result. Indeed, the main point is that the period 1 cap does not really matter 
so long as there are rational expectations about future caps. Second (and somewhat countering 
the first point), it may be important for the government to send signals concerning its current 
expectations about the long-term cap and expected price. This means that not only is the period 1 
cap important; so are expectations (in period 0) of future marginal costs and allowance prices in 
period 2, which also depend on future targets and benefits. The ceiling price in the allowance 
reserve mechanism is one way the government can signal an initial expectation about the correct 
current and future prices. 
A third and important reason for considering an allowance reserve is the concern that 
borrowing—a key mechanism for dealing with unexpectedly high costs in the short-term—may 
not work as we have assumed. Borrowing may not be implemented or it may be constrained in 
ways that limit its usefulness. To date, market-based policies have included only limited 
borrowing mechanisms. For example, the corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) program for 
light-duty vehicles allows a firm to undercomply in a given model year if it repays the borrowed 
credits within the subsequent three model years.  Meanwhile, there are examples of exceptionally 
high prices early in a borrowing-constrained cap-and-trade program as market participants 
anticipated or experienced a shortage of allowances. These include both the NOx State 
Implementation Plan (SIP) Call in the United States and the EU ETS. In the context of an 
emissions phasedown of the type discussed for greenhouse gas policy, a well-designed allowance 
reserve would change the market dynamics so that high prices tap the reserve and alter the 
market from tending to borrow allowances in the short term to either meeting demand or 
potentially banking allowances.   
Implementation Issues 
We turn next to a number of important practical issues surrounding the implementation of 
an allowance reserve. Most immediate are determining the appropriate ceiling price at which the 
reserve can be drawn down and the size of the reserve. Additional issues include whether the 
reserve expands or attempts to maintain the cumulative cap, how reserve allowances are 
introduced to the market, and whether the reserve design parameters would be managed by an 
executive board or decided through legislation. Resources for the Future  Murray, Newell, and Pizer 
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Ceiling Price and Reserve Size 
The most challenging implementation questions are the ceiling price at which the reserve 
can be tapped and the size of the reserve. In principle, the ceiling price should be related to the 
marginal benefit of emissions reduction to ensure that allowance prices—an indicator of 
marginal abatement costs—stay in line with marginal benefits. As noted early on, however, the 
marginal benefits of greenhouse gas reduction are not likely to be well-defined and are affected 
by some factors beyond policymakers’ control, including the extent to which other countries 
undertake emissions reductions. Thus policymakers may be more likely to focus on choosing a 
target ceiling price that is simply “not too high,” meaning that it does not create seemingly 
excessive hardship for the overall economy. Or, if there is a range of likely allowance prices and 
economic impacts associated with a chosen emissions limit, the ceiling price might be set at the 
upper end of the predicted range, assuming policymakers and stakeholders are comfortable with 
both the cap and the price range.  
If the allowance reserve is intended to credibly meet near-term demand at the ceiling 
price, then the ceiling price and the size of the reserve are inter-related. A low ceiling price will 
require a larger reserve to credibly deliver that price. A greater number of near-term events (e.g., 
weather, economic fluctuations) would be likely to come up against a low ceiling price and 
therefore require a larger reserve to meet that near-term demand. Alternatively, if the ceiling 
price is set high, the reserve plays a lesser role and can be smaller, as the circumstances under 
which it is likely to be used become more rare. The size of the reserve essentially determines its 
power to keep the allowance price at or below a given ceiling price; a larger reserve is necessary 
to ensure lower prices. A distinct issue—not directly addressed here—is whether the allowance 
reserve might be capped not only annually, but also cumulatively over time and/or phased out.   
One might argue that if the reserve is going to work as advertised—by providing strong 
and reliable relief against a run-up in prices driven by near-term events—it should be large 
enough to meet demand at the specified ceiling price under most foreseeable circumstances. The 
reserve could be set up to accommodate, for example, all conceivable demand shifts and still 
maintain the ceiling price by providing enough additional allowances to meet demand at that 
price. This could be informed by a convincingly large number of modeling scenarios that 
exogenously set the allowance price equal to the candidate ceiling price. The possible shortfall of 
allowances at that price (the difference between the emissions projected at that price and the 
proposed cap) would provide an estimate of the reserve size necessary  to maintain that price and 
cover potential shortfalls. Resources for the Future  Murray, Newell, and Pizer 
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Another possibility—if the program is expected to lean heavily on offsets (i.e., emissions 
reductions from outside capped sources) to achieve the cap—is to size the reserve to match the 
expected offset supply in the event that such offsets fail to materialize. The Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative, for example, allows additional use of offsets at certain allowance price thresholds. 
However, the availability of cost-effective offset opportunities is only one source of cost 
uncertainty, so its importance would have to be evaluated alongside other sources of uncertainty.   
Finally, in determining an upper bound for the size of the allowance reserve, it would not 
make sense to have the allowance reserve be larger than the difference between the target and the 
highest business-as-usual emissions forecast. An indefinite reserve of that size would be capable 
of lowering allowance prices to zero under the most pessimistic conditions, and therefore in 
practice it would go underused since reserve allowances would only be released at a price at or 
above the ceiling price. 
Maintaining the Cumulative Cap vs. Establishing a Range 
Because uncertainty about costs and allowance demand is likely to be highest at the 
beginning of a cap-and-trade program, we presume the reserve would be in place from the 
program’s inception. Before trading can begin, the government must allocate allowances to 
regulated entities either through free allocation or an auction. The existence of a reserve means 
that a separate allocation must also be made to a reserve account. There are two options for 
creating this reserve account: (1) create it from future allocations that, if never used, go back to 
the future allocation, which would maintain the cumulative cap over time; or (2) create it from 
allowances that, if never used, would vanish, which would establish a range of possible 
cumulative emissions outcomes that depend on the degree to which the reserve is tapped. It is 
also possible to construct a combination of these two options, with some reserve allowances 
drawn from the future and others not. If the cap-and-trade policy includes a price floor, as 
suggested above, reserve allowances could also come from any allowances that remained unused 
in prior periods.  And, revenue from the sales of reserve allowances could finance offset 
purchases.  Both of these options are variants that lie somewhere between maintaining the 
cumulative cap and creating a range of possible cumulative emissions outcomes.  
Based on recent policy proposals, a U.S. cap-and-trade program would likely establish an 
allowance cap that starts in the near term with allowance quantities that are perhaps five to ten 
percent below current emissions levels. The cap would then be scheduled to decline over several 
decades until a substantial reduction in annual emissions is achieved. Recent proposals have 
called for reductions on the order of fifty to eighty percent below current levels by 2050, or about Resources for the Future  Murray, Newell, and Pizer 
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ten to twenty percent per decade. It is unlikely that all of the allowances over an almost forty-
year period would be allocated up front. Therefore, the unallocated future allowances could serve 
as a source of reserve allowances. Again, if the objective is to maintain the long-term cap, and if 
these reserve allowances are in fact drawn down, this implies that future caps (unless modified in 
the future) will be that much tighter.  
A policy that seeks to maintain the same cumulative cap, even as the allowance reserve is 
tapped, would likely create expectations of higher future prices if the reserve allowances are used 
now to lower current prices (rather than banked to comply with the now tighter future cap). Such 
behavior would make sense if current prices are high compared to long-term expectations 
because borrowing—which would be desired to arbitrage long-term low prices against short-
term high prices—is either constrained or unpalatable.  However, most recent economic 
modeling of cap-and-trade proposals shows a strong tendency toward allowance banking in the 
early years of a program (EIA 2008, EPA 2008, Murray and Ross 2007, Paltsev et al 2007).  In 
this case, allowances from the reserve should not be necessary to offset near-term shocks (which 
the banked allowances can address) and, if the reserve is tapped, it should not depress current 
prices.  With allowances already being banked to reflect future scarcity, any allowances moved 
from the future to the present via the reserve would tend to be added to the current bank and 
returned to the future. It is only in the situation when firms are constrained in some way that is 
not well-captured by the referenced modeling results—particularly by a near-term shock before a 
bank can be built coupled with an explicit or implicit limit on individual borrowing—that 
system-wide borrowing from future allocations would represent a relaxation of that constraint, 
thereby lowering prices and containing costs.   
An alternative approach would be to establish the reserve with allowances that, if unused, 
would vanish. Here, the cumulative cap is a range and tapping the reserve more clearly loosens 
the emissions constraint. The lower bound of the cumulative cap defines the aspirational target of 
the policy if the reserve is never tapped and the price remains below the ceiling price. The upper 
end of the range, defined by the cumulative effect of tapping the reserve, reflects the maximum 
allowable cumulative emissions.  Based on the earlier discussion of how one would set the size 
of the reserve, this should be sufficient to maintain the ceiling price unless future expectations 
drive prices higher.  
Just as the approach of system-wide borrowing from future allocations may make more 
sense if there is strong societal commitment to a specific cumulative cap (and a willingness to 
accept the cost consequences), the cap-range approach may make more sense if there is strong 
societal commitment to maintaining incremental costs below the ceiling price (and a willingness Resources for the Future  Murray, Newell, and Pizer 
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to accept the emissions consequences). Of course, in either case the long-term cap will 
undoubtedly be adjusted in the future; the main issue here is how the specification of a default 
cumulative cap (be it larger or smaller) may affect future expectations and indeed future action. 
Both approaches address short-term constraints with an appropriately chosen ceiling price and 
reserve size.  However, the future borrowing approach, which maintains a predetermined 
cumulative cap, may create higher future price expectations and induce more mitigation than the 
range approach with the same aspirational cap.  On the other hand, the caps are not exogenous to 
the choice of design; a range approach where the aspirational cap is significantly more 
aggressive than the cap under the future borrowing approach could create even higher price 
expectations.  
Introducing Reserve Allowances to the Market 
Given the structure of the allowance reserve approach, use of the reserve must involve, at 
a minimum, payment to the government of the ceiling price for any tapped reserve allowances. 
Otherwise there can be no assurance that the cap only expands when the ceiling price is reached 
as there is no other way to ensure that the market is really willing to pay that much. More 
generally, there are a variety of ways to increase the cap in response to high prices. Newell et al. 
(2005) mention several approaches, including the announcement of an allowance split that makes 
each outstanding allowance worth more than one ton. However, this and other approaches that do 
not require payment to the government of the ceiling price have trouble maintaining the ceiling 
price without issuing too many or too few allowances. We therefore focus on two other options, 
which are somewhat equivalent. 
The first approach, described briefly above, introduces reserve allowances into the 
market via a supplemental reserve auction prior to the end of the period when firms must balance 
their emissions and allowances (i.e., the true-up period). Here the government offers a fixed 
number of allowances (i.e., the reserve size) to the market via an auction with a minimum price 
equal to the ceiling price. If, at the time of the supplemental auction, the market expects the 
ordinary allowances to meet demand at a market price below the ceiling price, then presumably 
the allowances would remain in the reserve unsold. If, on the other hand, allowance demand is 
sufficient to push prices up to or above the ceiling price, then there should be some willingness 
to purchase reserve allowances at the ceiling price. If the reserve size is sufficient to meet 
demand at the ceiling price, then there should be enough allowances for both the allowance 
market price and the reserve auction price to equilibrate at the ceiling price.  Resources for the Future  Murray, Newell, and Pizer 
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However, if the demand for additional allowances at the ceiling price exceeds the reserve 
auction quantity, the auction process would lead to prices being bid up until the market clears at 
some price above the ceiling price. In this case, the allowance reserve does not guarantee a 
ceiling price in the same way as an explicit price ceiling or an unlimited safety valve. It puts only 
so much weight on addressing cost concerns, leaving some guaranteed maximum level of 
emissions intact. As noted earlier, the case when the ceiling price is exceeded should correspond 
to a situation when (discounted) long-term price expectations exceed the ceiling price, not when 
there is only a near-term disruption or shortage (unless the reserve size is too small).      
Another approach, based on well-known financial instruments, is to have the government 
provide financial contracts (call options) that would give the holder the right, but not the 
obligation, to buy a certain quantity of allowances at the ceiling price (i.e., the strike price) 
during the true-up period each year.4 In fact, as pointed out by Unold and Requate (2001), a 
series of such options—of different size and with different strike prices—could be used to 
replicate any known marginal damage function or desired allowance supply function. Such 
options could be auctioned (like ordinary allowances) or they could come attached to ordinary 
allowances on a pro rata basis.5 The option’s value, whether auctioned or given away, would be 
determined by the ceiling (strike) price and expectations of whether, when, and with what 
eventual market price it would be exercised. In the event that allowance prices exceeded the 
ceiling (strike) price level, options holders would begin to exercise their option rights, but would 
stop once prices fell back below the ceiling price level. One substantive difference with the 
reserve auction discussed above is the timing of the allocation of reserve allowances or options 
for reserve allowances, with the allocation of options most likely occurring sooner. Whether this 
would be an advantage or disadvantage requires further analysis. Another difference is that under 
the option approach, the difference between the market and ceiling price—if there is one—goes 
to the option holder, and options could be either auctioned or allocated for free.  This feature 
suggests that options could be allocated in a way to help ensure that legislation passes, but can 
also create wasteful rent-seeking behavior.  
                                                 
4 If the execution date is not constrained in this way, it would create a very important difference: the effective annual 
reserve could accumulate over time if options accumulate, unexercised, year- after- year.  If options can be executed 
well before the true-up period, reserve allowances could enter the system based on early expectations of high prices 
which, by the time the true up period arrives, have been revised. 
5 See presentation by Jon A. Anda at the Carbon Market Insights Americas Conference. October 29–31, 2007, New   
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An Allowance Reserve Board or Legislative Specification? 
 While some envision a reserve or other cost-containment program with key design 
parameters specified in legislation, an alternative is to delegate that responsibility to an 
independent executive board. Specific reserve design elements might be better managed by an 
independent executive board because, over time, there would be a clear need to update policy in 
response to new information and Congress may not respond in a timely manner. Indeed, part of 
the motivation for the reserve in the first place is a recognition that the drivers of long-term 
prices will evolve over time, that policymakers will be slow to adjust parameters, and that 
borrowing may not be a fully effective or implemented element, which is required for dynamic 
efficiency. While a suitably designed mechanism would, in principle, allow the market to operate 
for long periods of time without revision (driven by the expectation of an eventual revision), it is 
certainly possible that Congressional inaction might challenge that capacity. Therefore, 
governance by an independent board may be useful.  
As discussed in Newell et al. (2005), an important remaining issue would be the precise 
governing mandate for such a board, the tools available to it, and the degree to which it operated 
subject to legislated rules versus having complete discretion. There has been a tendency to draw 
an analogy with the U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, along with parallels 
between its dual mandate of managing growth versus inflation and the dual objectives of climate 
protection versus containing costs. However, there are a variety of differences (Pizer and 
Tatsutani 2008), and this remains an active area of discussion. 
Conclusions 
While much of the debate in the literature on the economics of climate change regulation 
has focused on comparing pure price and pure quantity mechanisms—i.e., taxes versus cap-and-
trade—these policies are increasingly being viewed as too extreme to meet both practical and 
political needs. This paper has presented recent and perhaps provocative new arguments 
suggesting that a sufficiently flexible cap-and-trade system can in theory do at least as well as 
and potentially better than a tax (despite previous literature pointing the other direction). 
However, it is unlikely that the required flexibility to borrow allowances from the future and the 
associated requirement for rational expectations in dynamic allowance markets would be ensured 
in practice. All of this recommends a hybrid mechanism. Roberts and Spence (1976) first 
suggested the idea of a cap-and-trade system with both a floor and ceiling price.  We have taken 
their idea one step further and suggest that the ceiling price could come with a quantitative limit: 
what we call the allowance reserve. Resources for the Future  Murray, Newell, and Pizer 
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We have argued that the allowance reserve addresses certain shortcomings of the Roberts 
and Spence idea, including the need for more flexibility in the elements of policy design to 
balance competing political interests. It also solves a possibly thorny technical problem that 
arises when the Roberts and Spence idea is applied in a dynamic world that includes banking and 
a need to update policies—which has the potential to lead to a run on the price ceiling. But 
perhaps most fundamentally, it supports the idea of a flexible cap-and-trade system that seeks to 
achieve an intertemporal optimum. 
A number of additional details remain to be resolved, most notably setting the ceiling 
price and reserve size and how an allowance reserve would be institutionalized. Other issues tend 
to be primarily cosmetic or of a more general nature applicable to any market-based policy. In 
summary, the allowance reserve may help solve several previously insurmountable challenges in 
the current debate over climate policy design. This paper demonstrates that the notion of cap-
and-trade with an allowance reserve is more than simply a political solution. Rather given the 
considerable uncertainties we face now over the costs and benefits of greenhouse gas mitigation, 
the institutional difficulties faced by firm-level borrowing mechanisms, and the need for market-
based institutions that will react to the unfolding of new information over time, a cap-and-trade 
system with an allowance reserve is well supported by an economic view of efficient long-term 
climate policy. Resources for the Future  Murray, Newell, and Pizer 
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Technical Appendix 
Consider an effort to seek:  ( ) ( ) 11 2 1 minCq CQq +− , where qt is the emissions each 
period t, Q is the ultimate cumulative emissions goal (unknown until period 2), Ct is the cost of 
emissions level qt (which, unknown until period t, is positive if qt is below some baseline level 
and zero otherwise), and the cost functions include adjustment for discounting to the present.  
Given the ultimate resolution of uncertainty in period 2, we know costs in period 2 
are () 21 CQq −  and it would therefore be optimal to choose q1 such that ( )( ) 11 2 1 Cq CQq ′′ =− . 
With the information available when q1 has to be chosen, the best practical outcome would be 
() ( ) 11 1 2 1 Cq ECQq ′′ =− ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ , where E1 reflects the expectation formed in period 1 about the costs 
and target set in period 2. 
An optimizing government setting a period 1 tax, t1, in period 0 would choose 
() 10 1 1 ˆ tE C q ′ =⎡ ⎤ ⎣⎦  where  1 ˆ q  satisfies  ( ) ( ) 01 1 02 1 ˆˆ ECq ECQq ′′ =− ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ , thereby minimizing expected 
costs as seen in period 0. Firms would then choose to emit q1 such that  () 11 1 tC q ′ = , given the 
resolution of cost uncertainty in period 1. This outcome for q1 would not generally satisfy the 
efficiency condition,  () ( ) 11 1 2 1 Cq ECQq ′′ =− ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ because  ( ) [ ] 1 2 1 q Q C E − ′  will not generally equal 
() [] () 1 1 1 1 2 0 q C t q Q C E ′ = = − ′  under the tax.  
Now imagine the government instead sets a cap  1 q  in period 0 and a second period cap 
2 q  to deliver the ultimate objective  12 Qqq = + . Note that with second period cap  2 q , if firms 
have banked  11 qq −  at the end of period 1, in period 2 emissions would be Q – q1 and marginal 
costs would be  () 21 CQq ′ − . In this setting, a cost-minimizing firm would choose q1 such that 
() ( ) 11 1 2 1 Cq ECQq ′′ =− ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  regardless of the first period cap.  Resources for the Future  Murray, Newell, and Pizer 
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 Appendix Figure 1. Emissions and Price Outcomes under  



















































Allowance supply based on Roberts and Spence (1976)  Allowance supply with allowance reserve 
 
 